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The article discusses zoomorphism as part of the anthropocentric discourse aimed at establishing hu-
man dominance over animals. Basing on Jacques Derrida’s 1997 paper “The Animal That Therefore 
I Am (More to Follow),” the article approaches anthropomorphism and zoomorphism as culturally 
sanctioned ways of misrepresenting animality and shaping human attitudes towards real-life animals. 
A symptom of the misrepresentation is the gap between animals and their linguistic denotations. 
The specific aim of the article is to demonstrate that zoomorphism as used in everyday language 
conserves the human-centered vision of the world by ignoring the differences between individual 
animals. The discussion concludes by arguing that zoomorphism can be remedied by the individu-
alizing aspects of anthropomorphism. 
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Deconstructing the notion of animality, Derrida concentrated in particu-
lar on the manner in which the cultural representation of animals influences 
attitudes towards real-life animals. In his research, he analyzed popular un-
derstanding of animality, the linguistic associations, and discourses which 
animals are part of. He also studied the ethical consequences of ascribing 
anthropogenic meanings to animals. From the ecocritical perspective, the 
conclusions that Derrida reaches, especially in his 1997 paper “The Ani-
mal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow),” constitute a thought-provoking 
starting point for an inquiry into the manner in which language reinforces 
the anthropocentric perception of animals. In the essay, I am going to em-
ploy Derrida’s theory to analyze zoomorphism, that is, the attribution of 
animal traits to people. Specifically, I would like to argue that zoomorphism 
is secondary to anthropomorphism, and that it eventually preserves the 
superiority of man over animals. Following Derrida, I conclude by arguing 
that the zoomorphic dissimulation of animal heterogeneity can be remedied 
by anthropomorphic individualization of animals. 
The proponents of animal rights, among them Peter Singer, Tom 
Regan and Gary Francione, reconsider the man-animal binary, search-
ing for a principle of equity which would require moral consideration not 
only for people but also for animals. Singer designates the capability to 
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feel pain as such a principle.1 For Regan, moral significance is accorded 
to beings which could be defined as “subjects-of-a-life.”2 Francione claims 
that animals, similarly to people, should not be treated as property.3 
Other positions within animal rights discourse also approach animals as 
a generic group; Martha Nussbaum bases animal rights on their capabil-
ities.4 Stephen R.L. Clark and Mary Midgley argue for an equal distribu-
tion of happiness among all people and animals.5 Mark Rowlands claims 
that animals can be accorded basic rights in ignorance of their individual 
characteristics.6 The difficulty with the above theories is that they deny 
the variety of the animal world by referring to them not as individual be-
ings but in general as a homogeneous mass of indistinguishable bodies. 
In his 1987 study Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, Derrida deems 
dogmatic forms of knowledge, such as the idea of moral value of animals, 
as reductive because they presuppose “that there is one thing, one domain, 
one homogeneous type of entity, which is called animality in general, for 
which any example would do the job.”7 The reduction occurs in language, 
and its purpose is to designate a symbolic space in which people can de-
fine themselves as the superior form of life by subordinating the realm 
of the bodily, the animalistic, to the order of spirit attributed exclusively 
to man. It can be claimed that, for Derrida, the commendation of the hu-
man depends on an anthropocentric rhetoric of the animal, evinced and 
reinforced by linguistic denotations of animality. 
In his guidebook to ecocriticism, Ecocriticism (2012), Greg Garrard 
refers to the reductive representation of animality, and of animal singu-
larity, when he argues that the animal is a narrative trope used to convey 
human-generated meanings, as in the similes “brave as a lion” or “pighead-
ed.” According to Garrard, such phrases result from a play of similarity and 
difference between people and animals, and in general they can be put into 
two categories: metonymy and metaphor. Garrard’s typology is based on 
Roy G. Willis’s following thought:
The distinctive peculiarity of animals is that, being at once close to man and strange 
to him, both akin to him and unalterably non-human, they are able to alternate, 
1 P. Singer, Animal Liberation, New York 1990, p. 4.
2 T. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1983, p. 243.
3 G. Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law, Philadelphia 1995, p. 4. 
4 M. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, Cam-
bridge, MA and London 2006, p. 388.
5 Cf. M. Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter, Athens, GA 1983. 
6 M. Rowlands, Animal Rights: A Philosophical Defense, New York 1998, pp. 147–152. 
7 J. Derrida, Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, trans. G. Bennington and Rachel 
Bowlby, Chicago and London 1989, p. 57. 
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as objects of human thought, between the contiguity of the metonymic mode and 
the distanced, analogical mode of the metaphor.8
The linguistic use of animals proves that there is a “rhetoric of an-
imality”9 employed to convey strictly human meanings. The rhetoric is 
also functional in describing actual animals. Steve Baker thus refers to 
the scope of the rhetoric: “[c]ulture shapes our reading of animals just as 
much as animals shape our reading of culture.”10 What it means is that 
the animal can never be approached on its own; the other implication of 
animal constructivism is that “all philosophical discussion about animals 
will inevitably have to work with the ‘animals’ a culture has proposed to.”11 
Garrard employs the claim in his designation of metonymy, likeness, as the 
rhetoric underlying anthropomorphism and zoomorphism. 
Anthropomorphism, argues Garrard, occurs when metonymy is used 
to represent animals in human terms. Specifically, it concerns cases in 
which human characteristics, such as human emotions, traits of character 
or speech, are ascribed to animals. Examples of anthropomorphism can be 
found in literature, especially in texts dedicated for children as well as in pop-
ular culture, science and in philosophical criticism. An interesting example 
of the latter concerns Michael Leahy’s criticism of the animal liberationist 
movement; he accuses Singer and his followers of anthropomorphism, argu-
ing that the need of freedom is a human value which animal liberationists 
unduly project on animals.12 Scientific anthropomorphism can be detected in 
ethological research in which animal behavior is explained by using catego-
ries employed to describe human social and political relations. It is visible in 
research on primates. Anthropomorphism is also characteristic of people’s 
tendency to infer agency in a seemingly intentional behavior of various spe-
cies. Examples of such misguided inference include the malice of rats or of 
raccoons, the dolphin’s smile and the idea of the dog as man’s best friend. 
Anthropomorphism can even be found in texts disavowing anthropomorphic 
misrepresentations of animals, as in the following passage in which Temple 
Grandin criticizes the view of dolphins as sociable and peaceful: “dolphins 
are big-brained animals who commit gang rape, brutal killings of dolphin 
‘children,’ and the mass murder of porpoises.”13 Anthropomorphism is com-
8 R.G. Willis, Man and Beast, London 1974, p. 128.
9 S. Baker, Picturing the Beast: Animals, Identity and Representation, Manchester 
1993, p. 4.
10 Ibidem. 
11 G. Garrard, Ecocriticism, London and New York 2012, p. 160. 
12 Cf. M. Leahy, Against Liberation: Putting Animals in Perspective, London 1994.
13 T. Grandin and C. Johnson, Animals in Translation: The Woman Who Thinks Like 
a Cow, London 2005, p. 252. 
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mon in wildlife documentaries, in the imagery connected with pro-animal 
movements and in the trade of agricultural products. It can be argued that 
anthropomorphic designations are popular in culture and economy because 
they make the animal world easier to understand and, thereby, to relate to, 
which is frequently perceived as an asset from the viewpoint of ethology and 
animal welfare movements, as long as it is handled with caution.14 
The anthropomorphic imagery of animals can also be projected onto 
people. The process is called zoomorphism, and it is usually intended to 
bring out a particular feature of a person’s character or behavior. Ac-
cordingly, zoomorphism depends on a prior ascription of the feature to 
a given species. Due to the metonymic character of the ascription, zoo-
morphism is strongly reductive. It is also frequently deterministic, espe-
cially in its crude forms, including misogynist, racial and misanthropic 
misrepresentations of the other. A recent example of crude zoomorphism 
concerns the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda. The conflict between the Hutu 
majority and Tutsis was developing throughout the twentieth century; 
persecuted Tutsis fled Rwanda, mainly to Burundi and Uganda, and 
those of them who came back in more peaceful times were frequently 
referred to as cockroaches. In 1993, the ruling Hutu majority agreed to 
lessen their anti-Tutsi politics, and so a number of Tutsis returned to 
their homes. However, comparisons to cockroaches intensified, especially 
in media coverage, which eventually led to a civil war and countrywide 
ethnic cleansing of Tutsis. During the peak of the conflict in 1994, the 
dehumanizing comparison to cockroaches was heard almost everywhere, 
intensifying the genocidal massacre. 
The cockroach association depends on a previous “crudely anthropo-
morphic projection of despised human qualities,”15 such as dirtiness and 
ugliness, onto cockroaches. The projection is to justify extermination of 
the insects as despicable and harmful to people. By comparing Tutsis to 
cockroaches, the Hutu used the projection to justify their cockroach-like 
treatment of Tutsis. Similar justifications of animal-like treatment of people 
is detectable in the comparison of black people to monkeys or Jews to rats. 
There are also common examples of zoomorphic reductivism in pornogra-
phy, pop cultural sexuality (Playboy Bunnies) as well as in humanities 
and science, for instance in Hobbes’s theory of pre-political state of nature 
in which people treated each other like animals, or in Darwinian accounts 
concerning the development of language, societal structures and civiliza-
tion.16 At this point, it is worth mentioning the following claim by Garrard: 
14 G. Garrard, op.cit., pp. 155–158. 
15 Ibidem, p. 160. 
16 Cf. E.O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, London 2000, p. 547. 
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“unlike crude zoomorphism, critical zoomorphism involves the rejection of 
simplistic biological determinism (or essentialism) and attempts to give 
an evolutionary account of the full range of human traits, including lan-
guage […] and morality […] as well as […] sex and violence.”17 Similarly to 
critical anthropomorphism, there can be value in zoomorphic descriptions 
of humanity, provided the terms employed are chosen carefully and with 
empathy for the described people. 
The inevitable corollary of zoomorphism is that humans are treated 
“like animals,” although – as Timothy Morton argues – “animals are not 
‘animals,’”18 that is, objectively speaking they exist beyond their culturally 
constructed equivalents; they exceed the homogeneous horizon of human 
denotations, and come in a multiplicity of species and intra-species varieties. 
The question is why, despite their heterogeneous abundance, animals are 
treated “like animals,” i.e., as a homogeneous category determined along 
typically human concepts. 
Referring to the above question, in his “The Animal That Therefore I Am 
(More to Follow),” Derrida argues that the term “animal” is semantically 
not objective. On the contrary, it projects on actual animals some specific, 
culturally generated meanings that seldom have anything to do with re-
al-life animals. He refers to such a process of linguistic (mis)representation 
of animals as l’animot. The etymology of the term involves the sound of the 
French plural for animals, animaux, and the French equivalent for “word,” 
which is mot, altogether implying a term which relates to animals en masse, 
as a group, repressing intraspecific differences between individual animals. 
Derrida provides the ensuing explanation:
Animal is a word that men have given themselves the right to give. These humans 
are found giving it to themselves, this word, but as if they had received it as an 
inheritance. They have given themselves the word in order to corral a large num-
ber of living beings within a single concept: “the Animal” [“l’animot”], they say.19
 Accordingly, l’animot stands for “the plural of animals heard in the 
singular,”20 or as he further claims, it is the denotation of animal “plurality 
[...] assembled within the single figure of an animality that is simply op-
posed to humanity.”21 Derrida renders the extent of mass homogenization 
of animals into one animal figure in the ensuing passage: 
17 G. Garrard, op.cit., p. 161. 
18 T. Morton, The Ecological Thought, London 2010, p. 41. 
19 J. Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow), “Critical Inquiry” Win-
ter 2002, no. 2, p. 400. 
20 Ibidem, p. 415. 
21 Ibidem. 
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Confined within this catch-all concept, within this vast encampment of the animal, 
in this general singular, within the strict enclosure of this definite article (‘the An-
imal’ and not ‘animals’), […] are all the living things that man does not recognize 
as his fellows, his neighbors, or his brothers. And that is so in spite of the infinite 
space that separates the lizard from the dog, the protozoon from the dolphin, the 
shark from the lamb, the parrot from the chimpanzee.22 
On the one hand, Derrida claims that the linguistic suppression of an-
imal variety implies “asininity [bêtise]”23 because it impoverishes language. 
On the other hand, it symptomizes a “continued and organized [and] veri-
table war of the species.”24 What he means is that the “immense multiplic-
ity of other living things […] cannot in any way be homogenized, except 
by means of violence and willful ignorance.”25 When we say that someone 
is “brave as a lion,” we make one lion, or a linguistic designation of lions, 
a lion-signifier, stand for all the lions in the world. What we also do is to 
define all lions without exception as brave, even if lions have no concept 
of braveness. In Derrida’s view, such a denial of singularity is a crime. He 
argues as follows: 
The confusion of all nonhuman living creatures within the general and common cat-
egory of the animal is not simply a sin against rigorous thinking, vigilance, lucidity, 
or empirical authority; it is also a crime. Not a crime against animality precisely, 
but a crime of the first order against the animals, against animals.26
According to Cary Wolfe, Derrida reiterates here his theory of animal 
politics, “carnophallogocentrism,” which he discusses in “Eating Well,” or the 
Calculation of the Subject, and according to which the reason for suppressing 
animal singularity is to enable a “sacrificial structure” that allows for the 
transcendence of man by disavowing the animal, or the materialistically 
contingent, “in short the différence.”27 Katherine E. Young confirms Wolfe’s 
idea by claiming that “‘the animal’ becomes a totalizing sign and fantasy, 
which effectively crushes real animal differences in order to uphold the au-
thority or voice of the speaking subject.”28 It could thus be argued that the 
underlying logic of l’animot is the narcissistic drive of humans to confirm 
22 Ibidem, p. 402. 
23 Ibidem, pp. 399–400. 
24 Ibidem, pp. 399–400. 
25 Ibidem, p. 416. 
26 Ibidem, p. 416. 
27 C. Wolfe, Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist 
Theory, Chicago 2003, p. 66.
28 K.E. Young, Beastly Politics: Derrida, Animals, and the Political Economy of Meat, 
“Spectra: The Aspect Journal” 2015, no. 2 [online], <https://spectrajournal.org/SPECTRA/
article/view/240/168> [accessed 10.08.2016].
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their dominating position, and at the same time to subdue the animal other 
by denying the subjectivity of its individual existence. 
Crude zoomorphism seems to be based on the same principle; it rein-
forces the power of the dominating self by rendering the other as morally 
insignificant or condemnable. As the Rwanda example demonstrates, zoo-
morphism engenders violence to people by reducing their multidimension-
ality to simplistic and de-individualizing features, such as the despicable-
ness of cockroaches. Accordingly, while zoomorphism dehumanizes people, 
it could be argued that l’animot de-animalizes animals. They both enact 
the sacrificial structure which, for one part, confirms the superiority of the 
dominating subject, and for the other, provides ground for the “non-crim-
inal putting to death”29 of the discriminated entity, as in the case of stock 
animals and Tutsis in 1994 Rwanda. 
It is worth mentioning that the violence of zoomorphism is not only 
limited to the offensive comparisons of people to animals, but it also con-
cerns positive uses of zoomorphic imagery. Admittedly, phrases such as 
“eager beaver” or “lion-hearted” reduce one’s complexity, they are generic 
and simplistic, even if positively meant. Zoomorphism, including its mild 
inflections, dehumanizes people by presenting them in crude, generic and 
de-individualizing categories otherwise employed to deny the moral con-
siderability of animals. 
Accordingly, zoomorphism means a denigration of people because it 
denies human transcendence, actualized through the homogenization of 
animal, by re-directing the logic of l’animot onto people. The rhetoric of 
l’animot is hence present both in the linguistic disavowal of animal heter-
ogeneity as well as in zoomorphic descriptions of humans. It seems thus 
justified to claim that the beings most frequently zoomorphized are actual 
animals. Admittedly, l’animot could be deemed to be the logic of zoomor-
phizing both people and animals. This two-tier applicability of l’animot 
brings out Derrida’s ironic observation that, in philosophical tradition, he 
has not “noticed a protestation of principle, and especially a protestation 
of consequence against the general singular that is the animal.”30 A lack 
of such protestation not only perpetuates the abuse of animals, but it also 
sanctions the dehumanizing reductivism of zoomorphism.31 
The remaining question is whether anything can be done to counter the 
violence of l’animot. One of the possible remedies is avoidance of generaliza-
29 J. Derrida, “Eating Well,” or the Calculation of the Subject: An interview with Jacques 
Derrida, in: Who Comes After the Subject?, ed. E. Cadava, P. Connor and J-L Nancy, New 
York and London 1991, p. 113. 
30 J. Derrida, The Animal..., p. 408.
31 Cf. C, Wolfe, op.cit., p. 71. 
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tions and paying attention to individual beings, so that the gap between an-
imals and their linguistic denotations does not escalate. As Garrard argues, 
we should appreciate “the proliferation of differences within the schema of 
unfixed hierarchies.”32 However, arguments advocating animal singularity, 
for example those campaigning for animal rights, prove considerably diffi-
cult, if not entirely unworkable, in the reality of factory farming, congeneric 
feedlots and mass slaughter. Paradoxically, a likely solution to the generic 
dissolution of animals can be found in anthropomorphism. There are people, 
for instance ardent pet owners, who approach animals as individuals; not 
only do they live and spend free time with their pets, but they also give 
them names, and even provide them with beauty treatment and specialis-
tic health care. It can be claimed that in such cases animals are accorded 
their own distinctive identities; they are treated and frequently perceived 
as persons. While such attitudes need to be approached critically, it is still 
worth considering mild anthropomorphism as a solution, at least a partial 
one, to the de-individualizing rhetoric of l’animot. It can also be hoped that 
such a solution would help to revaluate the zoomorphisation of humans.
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